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[65 C.2d

IN RE HENRY

[Crim. No. 10029.

In Bank.

Nov. 22, 1966.]

In re GEORGE WILLIAM HENRY on Habeas Corpu&
[1] Criminal ,Law-Double Punishment.-Imposition of concurrent

sentences for attempted robbery of, and assault with a deadly
weapon on, a bar owner constituted double punishment (Pen.
Code, § 654) where both offenses were incident to the one objective of robbery; and the sentences could not be upheld on
the theory that the evidence also showed an attempted robbery
of the owner's clerk, a second victim, -and that the failure of
the information to name the clerk as the victim of the attempted robbery could be regarded· as an immaterial variance,
where the judge was of the opinion, and the prosecutor agreed,
that the sentences should be concurrent because there was but
one attempted robbery of the owner with the assault on him
forming an indivisible part of the transaction.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Sentence for assault with deadly weapon set aside,.
order to show cause discharged and writ denied.
George William Henry, in pro. per., and Allan B. 0 'Connor,
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-An information charged petitioner and
three codefendants, Jenkins, Whitfield, and Hill, with
attempted armed robbery of Chester Gambucci and with
assault upon him with a deadly weapon. A jury found petitioner guilty as charged. The trial court imposed concurrent
sentences for the two offenses. l
[1] Petitioner contends that the concurrent sentences inflict
multiple punishment in violation· of Penal Code section 654,2
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 275.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Criminal Law, § 1475.
tWe are not here concerned with a third sentence, also concurrent, for
petitioner's possession of a concealable weapon after he had been previ·
ously convicted of felony. Petitioner has served the maximum term of
five years for that offense. (Former Pen. Code, 112021 [S18ts. 1953,
ch.36].)
2Penal Code section 654: "An act or omission which is made punish.
able in different ways by different provisions of this code may be pun·
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and invokes the rule of Neal v. State of California (1960) 55
Ca1.2d 11, 19 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839], that "If all of
the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may
be punished for anyone of such offenses but not for more than
one. "
Gambucci owned a liquor store and adjoining bar, and
Charles Moe was his clerk. On January 13, 1958, petitioner,
Whitfield, and Hill entered the store. Whitfield and Hill drew
pistols, and petitioner stood watching the entrance. Hill
pointed his gun at Moe and ordered him to put money from
the cash register into a paper bag. As Moe was doing so Whitfield hit Gambucci with the butt of his pistol and then shot
him. Meanwhile, petitioner went into the bar and at gunpoint
took the telephone receiver from a customer who was making a
call. Petitioner, Whitfield, and Hill then fled from the store,
leaving the money scattered on the floor. They rode away in an
automobile driven by defendant Jenkins. Shortly thereafter
police stopped the automobile and took the four defendants
into custody.
The Attorney General concedes that the undisputed evidence establishes that the assault and the attempt to rob Gambucci were incident to the one objective of robbery and that
the sentence for the assault, the offense subject to the lesser
punishment,S should be set aside. The two sentences cannot
stand because of possible prejudice to petitioner when he
comes before the Adult Authority for the fixing of his term.
(People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 748, 763 [26 Cal.Rptr.
473, 376 P.2d 449] ; In re Cruz (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 178, 181 [49
Cal.Rptr. 289,410 P.2d 825] ; In re Romano (1966) 64 Ca1.2d
826,829 [51 Cal.Rptr. 910, 415 P.2d 798].)
[1] Despite the Attorney General's concession as to double
punishment, the question has arisen whether both sentences
should be upheld on the grounds that the evidence established
an assault upon and attempted robbery of Gambucci and an
attempted robbery of Moe, that section 654 does not apply
when one lawless course of conduct harms more than one
victim (Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11, 20;
People v. Ridley (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 671, 678 [47 Cal.Rptr. 796,
408 P.2d 124]), and that the naming of Gambucci rather than
ished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished
under more than one..•• "
8Assault with a deadly weapon is punishable by imprisonment for not
more than 10 years. (Pen. Code, § 245.) Attempted armed robbery is
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. (Pen. Code,
II 211a, 213, 664, subd. 1.)
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Moe as the victim in the charge of attempted robbery should
be regarded as an immaterial variance under Penal Code
section 956. 4
Discussion between the trial judge and counsel before the
imposition of the concurrent sentences, however, establishes
that the prosecuting attorney did not contend and the judge
did not determine that mUltiple sentences should be imposed
because of the proof that both Moe and Gambucci were victims
of defendants' course of criminal conduct. That discussion
shows that the judge was of the opinion, and the prosecuting
attorney agreed, that the sentences should be concurrent
because there was one attempted robbery with the assault on
Gambucci forming an indivisible part of the transaction. I In
view of this manifest intent of the prosecuting attorney who
drafted the information charging offenses against Gambucci
only and of the judge who stated that he was imposing sen4Penal Code section 956: "When an offense involves the commission
of, or an attempt to commit a private injury, and is described ·1rlth
sufficient certainty in other respects to identity the act, Ipl erroneous
allegation as to the person injured, or intended to be injured, or of·. the
place where the offense was committed, or of the propert,- involved in its
commission, is not material."
IAfter the jury returned their verdicts, counsel for Hill and petitioner
Henry ·stated that those defendants wished to waive time for probation
report and receive sentence at once. The following colloquy tqok place:
"THE COURT: •.• [T]here is the matter of making the sentences run
concurrently or consecutively. Normally we make them run concurrently •.. when they are convicted of separate offenses at one trial, and
these all arose out of one series of acts, 'MR. LEVY [Deputy District Attorney]: One transaction.
"THE COURT: - unless there's some cogent reason to the contrary,
the Court would make the sentences run concurrently. Now, it you feel
there is any such reason an investigation should be made as to any prior
matters that would be material in that regard, I will refer it [for probation report. The judge pointed out that he had no control over the
minimum punishments prescribed by law for the defendants who had
suffered a prior conviction and were found to have been armed with a
deadly weapon at the time of the attempted robbery.] ••• All I can do
is make the judgments on the offenses with which they are charged i" thill
Intormatioft. run consecutively or concurrently.
"MR. LEVY: I think the Court bas indicated its desire that they run
concurrently because it was jU8t the one act and it W(J8 jU8t t'M one
armed or attempted armed robbery and the assault i8 aU a part 01 the
one aot.
"THE COURT: Well, I mean it was all one thing. They went in to rob
the place and one of them, for one reason or another, pulled a gun and
shot somebody. The jury having found they were acting together, they
are all chargeable with responsibility for that.•.• But it you feel there
is some reason why the Court should consider making them run consecutively, of course I would refer it and listen to you on it....
, I MR. LEVY: ••• I think that the Court is correct and fair and just,
and we will concur or stipulate that the Court sentence at this time, and
that the Sfntences be concurrent...• " (Italics added.)

)
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tences for the offenses charged in that information, we cannot
now uphold the two sentences on the entirely different theory
that the omission from the information of an allegation that
defendants attempted to rob Moe was a mere mistake in pleading. (See People v. Foster (1926) 198 Cal. 112, 122 [243 P.
667] ; People v. Hedderly (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 476, 480 [274 P.2d
857].)
The sentence for .assault with a deadly weapon is set asi4e
and the Adult Authority is directed to exclude that purported
sentence from its consideration in fixing petitioner's term.
Petitioner is not entitled to release at this time, ho;wever, for
he is held under the valid jUdgment of conviction of:attempted
armed robbery. The order to show cause is discharged and the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and
Burke, J., concurred.

